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Decision Analysis and FDA Drug Review:
A Proposal for "Shadow" Advisory Committees
John M. Mendeloff
Introduction
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has long been in a
crossfire between those who complain of overly strict standards for approving
new drugs and those who charge the opposite.1 Who is correct? What
should FDA's standards be? What are they now? Do they differ for different
classes of drugs? Should they, and, if so, how much? When the FDA
places its stamp of approval - "safe and effective" - on a drug, could
this mean, e.g., only a 5% chance that it is not effective, a 25% chance
that it is not effective, or that it is more likely than not that it is ineffective?
From a normative perspective, should the FDA ever approve a drug that
reviewers believe is probably not effective?
The short answer to most of these issues is: We don't really know.
Note that the question here is not whether the FDA engages in risk-benefit
assessments. It certainly does, tolerating greater side effects or risks of
adverse reactions when clinical benefits are greater. Instead, the issue is
whether the standard of proof used to judge whether a drug is "effective"
varies with benefits and risks. "Standard of proof' refers most obviously
to the level of statistical significance required but includes all other factors
relevant to assessing the evidentiary burden a drug sponsor has to bear -
e.g., the number of studies, the comparability of control groups or the use
of surrogate endpoints of less certain clinical validity.
For many years, the FDA resolutely adhered to the view that the
same standard of proof for assessing effectiveness should apply to all
drugs whether "breakthrough" drugs or "me-toos." It argued that the
statute's requirement to demonstrate "efficacy" should be construed in
narrowly scientific terms rather than in a policy context where the
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I See, e.g., Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Comm.
on Science and Technology, Oversight: The Food and Drug Administration's Process
for Approving New Drugs, 96th Cong. 1st sess. (1979).
6 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 203 [Summer 1995]
appropriate standard of proof depends upon the relative harms from
delaying "good" drugs and approving "bad" ones. If only scientific criteria
are relevant, then all drugs should be subject to the same standard of
proof. Treating the issue as a purely scientific one helped to protect the
agency from challenges to its authority. Its expertise, after all, lies in
assessing evidence of effectiveness. In contrast, quantifying the uncertainties
and highlighting the value judgments exposes both the limits of science
and the policy discretion that the FDA must exercise.
Only in the last few years, as a result of pressures from constituencies
concerned with AIDS, has the FDA taken steps to acknowledge that a
different standard of proof for assessing evidence of effectiveness should
sometimes be used. This acknowledgment that the choice of the standard
of proof for assessing effectiveness involves policy judgments makes this
an opportune time to ask what those standards currently are and what
they should be.
A major reason why we have such limited understanding of the
policies that the FDA actually follows in reviewing drugs is that the
agency makes little attempt to explain and justify its interpretation of the
evidence and its use of its discretion. (In contrast, most regulatory decisions
of the Occupational Safety & Health Administration or the Environmental
Protection Agency are accompanied by tens or hundreds of pages of
Federal Register preamble.) Particularly striking is the absence of explicit
attempts to quantify key variables and the failure to place them in a
framework where the trade-offs and uncertainties can be highlighted.
These omissions also make it more difficult to decide whether the
FDA is making the right choices. Normative analysis is hindered if we
cannot systematically compare the gains and losses from approving a drug
(or, in the case of prospective analysis, the expected gains and losses). Of
course, even with such comparisons, available clinical data may often be
too ambiguous to justify any clear normative conclusions.
Decision analysis could provide the framework that is needed to
consider the trade-offs and uncertainties. It can be a useful tool for assessing
a sequence of decisions made under uncertainty. And, its structuring of a
problem requires explicit attention to describing the possible uncertain
events, estimating the probability of the different outcomes, and valuing
each possible outcome.
Because decision analysis makes assumptions of an analysis explicit,
it could shed light on some of the positive issues of drug review, e.g.: Are
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drugs for serious diseases without good alternative treatments approved
with less evidence of effectiveness than other drugs?
At least in the near term, the FDA is not likely - for a mix of
political and analytical reasons - to make explicit use of decision analysis.
Therefore, this paper proposes a strategy that might be called "shadow
advisory committees." Its task would be to test and develop the
methodology. To the extent that it proves feasible, shadow committee
findings could both provide a standard against which to assess FDA
decisions and help illuminate FDA's decision-making process.
Before turning to that proposal, we first review the positive and
normative issues involved with the standard of proof. Although this is not
the only decision variable for the FDA, it is probably the most important
one and deserves special attention.
The FDA's Standard of Proof
As noted above, we use "standard of proof' to refer to the evidentiary
burden that a drug sponsor must bear to support claims of effectiveness
and safety. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides very
little guidance,2 e.g., § 505(d) states:
... "substantial evidence" means evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the
basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions
of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling
thereof.
The FDA interpreted the plural in "investigations" normally to require at
least two studies, but not until 1970 did the FDA regulations begin to
define "adequate and well-controlled" investigation.3 These stated that
experimental and control groups should be comparable, bias should be
controlled and quantitative evaluations should be conducted. While useful,
these criteria remained fairly general; moreover, the agency retained the
right to waive them when it chose.
A drug is considered "effective" if substantial evidence shows that it
does what its proposed labeling says that it does. A drug is considered
"safe" if its risks are acceptable in light of its benefits. It is up to the drug's
sponsor to carry out pre-clinical tests and clinical trials to persuade the
FDA that these criteria have been met.
2 Pub L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended.
3 Part 130.12 of the New Drug Regulations. 37 F.RI 7250 ff. (1970).
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Over time, additional guidelines have been developed on significant
issues like the endpoints that clinical trials must address. For example,
when must a cancer drug show not merely activity against tumors, but
survival gains, and when must the survival gains be equal to or greater
than that provided by alternative treatments.4 The FDA produces a
"Summary Basis of Approval" document for each drug approved, and
although it reviews (in about 80 single-spaced pages) the findings from
studies, it does not present any arguments about risk-benefit trade-offs or
probabilistic statements about the overall weight of the evidence. Advisory
Committees that are involved in most new drug decisions do sometimes
discuss broader issues but they rarely attempt to make quantitative
evidentiary judgments or explicit normative judgments about weights to
be accorded different health outcomes.
In some respects, the FDA has treated drugs differently as a function
of clinical importance and risks. As noted, the FDA accepts higher patient
risks when the drug also can confer greater clinical benefits. Also, the
FDA gives priority in the review queue to drugs that represent more
important clinical advances and is more willing to grant pre-approval
access to drugs for serious and life-threatening diseases. In practice, the
FDA has approved drugs within a few months and on the basis of a single
study in cases like L-dopa for Parkinson's disease in 1970 and AZT for
AIDS in 1987.5 Yet, these were exceptions, and the FDA plausibly claimed
that the single studies were so persuasive that approval represented no
lowering of its standard of proof.
However, in the fall of 1991, the FDA approved the drug DDI
following the recommendation of its Anti-Viral Advisory Committee; and
the transcript of that meeting shows clearly that a different, lower standard
of proof was being employed. As one participant stated:6
It is, indeed, hard to say that effica has been shown by adequate and well-controlled
trials. I do not really think that Yhe data do meet the standard. But we ought to
approve. We ought not to fudge on it. We intend to operate on a lower standard on
this occasion than the standard that is ordinarily applied.
4 Joyce A. O'Shaughnessy et. al., Commentary Concerning Demonstrations of Safety
and Effcacy of InvestigationalAnti-Cancer Agents in Clinical Trials, 9 J. Clin. Oncology
2225 (1991).
5 Kenneth I. Kaitin, Case Studies ofExpedited Review: AZTand L-Dopamine, Law,
19 Med. & Health Care 242 (1991).
6 Paul Meier in transcript of FDA Anti-Viral Advisory Committee Meeting, July
18, 1991, at 186.
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In April, 1992, the FDA proposed to approve drugs on the basis of
trials7
establishing that the drug has an effect on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably
likely.., to predict clinical benefit. Approval could be granted where there is some
uncertainty as to the relation of that endpoint to clinical benefit...
as long as the sponsor agreed to conduct post approval studies and to
accept expedited procedures to remove drugs when the further studies
failed to confirm effectiveness. This accelerated review was to be limited
to drugs that "provide meaningful therapeutic benefit over existing
treatment for patients with serious or life-threatening diseases." Although
reliance on surrogate measures is nothing new - e.g., approving drugs to
prevent strokes on the basis of evidence that they lower blood pressure -
this regulation is the first formal acceptance of surrogates of "uncertain"
validity.
Thus the FDA has taken some steps to adopt a lower standard of
proof for important new drugs for serious diseases. But that fact still
leaves us with many questions: What exactly is this new, lower standard
of proof? What was the old one? More generally, does the notion of a
uniform standard of proof = or indeed of a new, two-tier system -
really describe FDA's practices? Does each FDA division behave differently?
Do results vary as FDA staff change or as different members become
influential on its advisory committees?
Normative Perspectives on the Standard of Proof
The FDA frequently defines its criterion for approval in terms of a
finding thatthe clinical benefits that a drug will confer outweigh the risks
that it poses. Using this criterion, the errors that the FDA can make are 1)
allowing the marketing of a drug even though the benefits do not justify
the risks and 2) not allowing the marketing of a drug even though the
benefits do justify the risks. In this framework, FDA's proper objective
may be posed as choosing the standard of proof that will minimize the
sum of the costs to society of regulatory errors. It has long been recognized
that this framework may be useful for thinking about the choice of the
standard of proof.'
7 Food and Drug Administration, Proposed Rule: New Drug, Antibiotic, and
Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 57 F.R. 13234 (1982).
8 Henry Grabowski &John Vernon, The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
the Benefits and Risks (1983); Talbot Page, A Framework for Unreasonable Risk in The
Toxic Substances Control Act, Managing Risks from Carcinogens (Wiliam Nicholson,
ed. 1981).
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Also, decision analysis seems well-suited for helping to think through
individual drug review decisions. In addition to comparing the expected
gains and losses from approval decisions, decision analysis is tailored to
assess the highly relevant option of postponing a decision until additional
information has been obtained. In clinical practice, decision analysis has
made some headway in the last decade, especially in informing judgments
about the desirability of diagnostic procedures.9 Although physicians (like
most people) dislike being prodded to make explicit probabilistic estimates
and overt value judgments, a process that requires those steps to be taken,
and taken openly, has potential to lead to better informed, more thoughtful
choices.
An analysis of error costs can be used to evaluate different regulatory
policies employing different standards of proof. Suppose country A has a
strict standard of proof, allowing six "good drug errors" and only three
"bad drug errors." While country B's more relaxed review standard leaves
it more prone to "bad drug errors" (seven) than to "good drug errors"
(three). If the goal is to minimize the sum of error costs, then we need to
know the costs of the errors to be able to conclude which policy is better.
If the average costs of both error types are the same, then country A's
total costs will be lower because it has fewer total errors. If the expected
cost of "good drug errors" is much greater, then country B's less stringent
standard of proof will lead to the lower total costs.
The closest that anyone has come to actually applying this framework
was Wardell in the 1970's - comparing the U.S. and Britain. In a series
of articles' he demonstrated that 1) Britain had approved many more
drugs than the U.S. had and that mutually approved drugs had generally
been approved earlier there and 2) many of the drugs in which Britain
had the lead were viewed by physicians there as important therapies. He
also argued that Britain did not experience a very large burden of extra
9 Harold C. Sox, Jr., Michael C. Higgins & Keith I. Marton, Medical Decision
Maling (1988); Milton Weinstein & Harvey Fineberg, Clinical Decision Analysis
(1980).
10 William Wardell, Introduction ofNew Therapeutic Drugs in the United States and
Great Britain: An International Comparison, 14 Clin. Pharmacol. & Ther. 773 (1973);
William Wardell, Therapeutic Implications of the Drug Lag, 15 Clin. Pharmacol. &
Ther. 73 (1974); William Wardell, British Usage andAmerican Awareness of Some New
Therapeutic Drugs, 14 Clin. Pharmacol. & Ther. 1022 (1973); William Wardell &
Louis Lasagna, Regulation and Drug Development (1975); and William Wardell, The
Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Areas ofPatterns ofDrugs Marketed in the
United States and Great Britain from 1972 to 1976, 24 Clin. Pharmacol. & Ther. 499
(1978).
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toxicity as a result of its earlier approvals, although the limited available
data precluded firm, quantitative conclusions.
Wardell's argument eventually won at least partial acceptance among
top FDA staff and was well publicized at the first Congressional hearing
to criticize the FDA for being too strict rather than too lax." Still, although
several studies12 have updated the counts of drug approvals in Britain and
the U.S., no one has attempted a new, comprehensive assessment of the
clinical significance of gains and risks.
One reason may be that such comprehensive studies are difficult to
carry out. Another is that, at least with respect to Britain, the lag has
disappeared. There is still a U.S. lag when we consider all drugs approved
since 1962, but, for the most recent period for which we have full data
(1983-87), the U.S. introduced considerably more drugs and introduced
mutually available drugs sooner than Britain.13 To the extent that standards
of proof contributed to this shift, most observers attribute it to toughened
British standards rather than to looser U.S. standards. 4 Whatever the
reasons, the apparent disappearance of a lag reduces incentives to explore
the clinical and normative significance of the differences. It also eliminates
the alternative drug regulation regime needed to compare different standards
of proof. Its disappearance leaves us in more of a quandary about how to
assess U.S. performance.
We can, however, ask whether the FDA has acted in accord with an
important implication of the error cost minimization principle: The
standard of proof should vary with the size of the error costs."5 When
potential drug benefits are large relative to risks, the expected cost of
withholding it is large. Therefore, the standard of proof should be lower.
The FDA should not have one standard of proof, but many. As discussed
1n Supra note 1. a
12 Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., The Drug Lag. An Update of New Drug Introductions in
the United States and in the United Ingdom, 1977 through 1987, 46 Clin. Pharmacol.
& Ther. 121 (1989); Hans Berlin & Bengt. Jonsson, International Dissemination ofNew
Drugs: A Comparative Study of Six Countries, 7 Managerial Decision Economics 235
(1986); Paul L. Coppinger, Carl C. Peck & Robert J. Temple, Understanding Comparisons
of Drug Introductions between the United States and the United Kingdom, 46 Clin.
Pharmacol. & Ther. 139 (1989).
13 Coppinger, Peck & Temple, supra.
14 Alister Dunning, Regulation, New Drug Development, and the Question of Delay,
41 F. D. Cos. L.J. 139 (1986).
15 Joanna Siegel & Marc Roberts, Reforming FDA Policy: Lessons from the AIDS
Experience, Regulation, Fall 1991, at 71.
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above, it has moved to adopt a lower standard for AIDS drugs and
perhaps others, but we still do not have much insight into what the
different standards ought to be.
How to Proceed?
What research strategies can we adopt for learning more about the
normative and positive aspects of drug review, including the standard(s)
of proof that the FDA uses and should use? Further studies of international
differences in the availability of drugs may continue to yield suggestive
findings, but, since many factors affect availability, linking those differences
to regulatory decisions is often difficult. In any event, international
differences have been shrinking and will probably continue to do so as
Europe, the U.S. and Japan attempt to make their regulatory policies for
drugs more consistent.
Expert reviews of FDA Summary Basis of Approval documents and
of transcripts of advisory committee meetings may also prove useful for
understanding FDA decision making. However, we believe that a proposal
for using the framework of decision analysis to review drug approval
decisions could not only provide information to address both the positive
and normative issues, but could also help to advance the use of techniques
that will lead to more rational regulatory policies.
Specifically, the proposal is to convene panels that will review the
data on drugs that the FDA has recently reviewed. The main tasks of
these panels would be to: (1) elicit explicit judgments from the experts
about the probability distribution of the benefit and risk profiles; (2)
compare the risks and benefits, preferably using a common metric (e.g.,
quality adjusted life years), to provide quantitative assessments of the net
clinical benefits associated with the use of the drug in different subgroups;
and (3) show what the different assumptions imply in terms of net clinical
benefits.
It should be apparent why it will be difficult for the FDA to embrace
the use of decision analysis publicly. In addition to the undeveloped state
of the technique's application to drug review, its use is fraught with
political risks. Making explicit judgments about how to weigh the risks of
certain adverse events against the benefits of treatment is controversial.
Acknowledging explicitly that drugs are being approved despite a non-trivial
probability that they are not effective poses a threat, as we argued above,
to FDA autonomy.
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The panels proposed here would not be asked to recommend what
the FDA should do or should have done. Unlike FDA Advisory Committees,
their task is to make explicit, to the extent permitted by the available data,
the building blocks for those judgments. For example, if the objective of
FDA policy is to maximize net clinical benefits, then given the expected
gains and losses from approving or not approving a drug, what probability
of effectiveness should be required before a particular drug is approved?
With the many complexities posed by drug approval decisions, will
it be possible to carry out this exercise and learn anything useful? The
probable answer is: Not always, but sometimes. Utility will depend largely
on the quality of available data, which will affect panelists' ability to reach
agreement about the facts. It will also depend upon their ability to agree
about how to value clinical gains and losses. Yet, even when panelists
cannot agree, the process may be useful by highlighting areas of uncertainty
and focusing attention on how the FDA proceeded to resolve them.
Risk-benefit decisions are facilitated when risks and benefits can be
placed in a common metric. The use of quality of life measures in assessments
of medical technologies has increased swiftly and become more
sophisticated.16 A survey of pharmaceutical firms conducted in the late
1980's reported that over 60% used quality-of-life instruments in clinical
trials. 7 Many quality-of life-measures are specific to particular diseases
(e.g. the Arthritis Ladder Scale) or to aspects of illness (e.g. the Self
Esteem Scale). However, a number of generic instruments have been
developed to compare outcomes across populations and interventions.
18
These will be extremely useful, but questions will remain about whether
they properly weight different dimensions of clinical impacts, and use of
single numbers to sum up complicated problems runs the risk of obscuring
rather than clarifying value judgments that must be made. 19
16 Jennifer Falotico-Taylor, Mark McClellan & Frederick Mosteller, The Use of
Quality-of-Life Measures in Technology Assessment, in Quality of Life and Technology
Assessment (F. Mosteller & J. Falotico-Taylor, eds. 1989).
17 Brian Luce; Joan Wechsler & Carol Underwood, The Use of Quality-of-Life
Measures in the Private Sector, in op cit.
18 Robert Kaplan et al., The Quality of Well-being Scale, 27 Med. Care S.27 (1989);
David Feeny & George Torrance, Incorporating Utility-based Quality-of-Life Assessment
Measures in Clinical Trials, 27 Med. Care S.190 (1989); and Donald Patrick & Richard
Deyo, Generic and Disease-Specific Measures in Assessing Health Status and Quality ofLife,
27 Med. Care S.217 (1989).
19 Frederick Mosteller, John Ware, Jr. & Sol Levine, Final Comments on the Conference
on Advances in Health Assessment, 27 Med. Care S.282 (1989).
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When generic measures are not available, panelists will still have to
judge the weight of different impacts. The basis for judgments should be
clearly explained. With respect to both facts and values, the panels need a
process to facilitate consensus without imposing a false one.
Panels could not do their work until sufficient information has been
made public. Generally, the earliest time would follow an FDA advisory
committee meeting to review a New Drug Application. Then, evidence
on efficacy and safety is generally available for public scrutiny; panels
would also have the benefit of the transcript of the advisory committees'
deliberations. Panels should address new drugs for which the data base is
relatively good. For drugs in which quality-of-life concerns are very
important, data should be available on those concerns, preferably using
generic measures to ease comparisons of benefits and risks. The panels
could review drugs that the advisory committees (and the FDA) disapprove
as well as those they approve.
It will also be sensible to review drugs for which the advisory committee
split its vote concerning "safety and effectiveness." (Based on a review of
recent advisory committee meeting results, non-unanimous votes occur in
a sizable minority of cases.) A review of these drugs is more likely to
identify the reasons why people disagree and the boundaries that currently
separate adequate and inadequate evidence and acceptable and unacceptable
costs of drug use.
The panels would include the types of clinical experts who comprise
FDA advisory committees, but they would be supplemented by experts in
decision analysis and in the measurement of health status. Because each
panel would focus on only a single drug, its membership could be small,
with perhaps only three or four clinical experts.
All of the analytic tasks described above are difficult, but they are
precisely the ones implied by FDA's objective of showing that beneficial
effects outweigh adverse effects. It typically makes this analysis in an
informal, qualitative way. A more formal, quantitative approach could
serve several functions: (1) shed light on the desirability of particular
drug-approval decisions; (2) raise more general questions about the trade-
offs that should be made for different classes of drugs; and (3) suggest
insights about the actual decision rules that the FDA and its advisory
committees are using.
No one or even several such panels can provide unambiguous evidence
about what FDA's current practices are or about what they should be.
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There are often too many unknowns in each case to be certain about what
the FDA or the advisory committee members must have been assuming;
or about what standard of proof would be the proper one to use in light
of the expected costs and benefits of approval and whether that standard
was, in fact, met. Yet this approach, even on a small scale, seems likely to
suggest tentative answers that could be the basis for more thorough research.
And, if the use of a decision analytic framework seems useful, over time
the panels should accumulate stronger evidence about the review process.
A Final Case
In conclusion, we can consider a case where decision analysis might
contribute some insights. One issue that the FDA and National Cancer
Institute (NCI) Working Group could not agree on was the proper
endpoints for drugs for previously untreated advanced ovarian cancer,
where standard therapy produces substantial toxicity and modest
improvements in survival.2" The use of carboplatin for this disease had
been the subject of hot debate in 1989 between Robert Temple from the
FDA and Bruce Chabner from NCI before the National Committee to
Review Current Procedures for Approval of New Drugs for AIDS and
Cancer (the "Lasagna committee").21
Temple, Director of FDA's Office of Drug Evaluation, acknowledged
that carboplatin had fewer side effects than the standard treatment,
cisplatinum, which some patients could not tolerate. The available evidence
showed that carboplatin did have anti-tumor activity, but there were no
studies comparing it to cisplatinum or suggesting that it was as effective as
cisplatinum. Temple stated that the FDA would have no trouble approving
carboplatin as second-line therapy, i.e., for patients who failed to respond
to or who could not tolerate the standard therapy. But:22
The reservation, though, that I would have is that if one simply approved
carboplatin for unvarnished, unmodified front line therapy without knowing how it
compares, I think there is a potential serious loss until you have reasonable evidence
that survival is comparable.
He stated that the Advisory Committee believed that "comparable complete
response rates alone are not enough in ovarian cancer because of the
known dramatic survival gain."
20 Aaron Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981).
21 National Committee to Review Current Procedures for Approval of New Drugs
for AIDS and Cancer, Unedited transcript of meeting Feb.1, 1989.
22 Id. at 45.
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In response, Bruce Chabner, Director of the Cancer Treatment
Division at the NC, gave a different twist to the same facts:23
I feel personally that for most solid tumors we do not currently have effective
therapies. We have some therapies that produce responses. We have therapies that
improve survival to a small extent. But just to take the exampIle of ovarian cancer,
when Bob [Temple] says it is important to compare carboplatin against standard
therapy, I don't agree. I don't think that we have good therapy for ovarian cancer
now. The cure rate is only 20% at most and this is in somewhat selected patients. I
can't consider a disease where 80% of the patients are dying of that cancer to have a
standard therapy.
Reading this argument, one is struck by the different framing of the
choice. Tversky and Kahneman" have shown that when choices are framed
in terms of losses, people are more likely to be willing to take risks: If
80% will die with standard treatment, then we must be willing to gamble
on something new; but, if we can already save 20%, then we should be
cautious about jeopardizing those gains. But the perspectives of Temple
and Chabner also reflect the different missions of their organizations. The
Division of Cancer Treatment's charge is to develop better treatments for
dying patients; the FDA's, to ensure that new drugs are safe and effective.
Given the impact that framing and organizational interests may
have on perceptions of drug approval issues, the case for systematically
examining these choices seems even stronger.
23 Id. at 44.
24 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 20.
